| Many state and local governments, facing ballooning pension promises
      to police officers, firefighters, teachers and other public employees, are
      rushing to sell bonds to cover the shortfall. That strategy has sometimes
      backfired in recent years, leaving taxpayers on the hook for even more
      debt. 
      States and municipalities are drawn to bond sales because they bring instant
      cash, easing budget pressures without further tax increases or reductions
      in retirement benefits.
       
      But critics say the bonds could prove costly for some officials using them
       and for the local taxpayers. The cities and states have to pay a fixed
      rate of interest on the bonds, and are essentially betting they can earn
      a higher rate of return by investing the proceeds in their pension funds.
       
      But recent investment losses have already left some cities and states on
      the hook for a mounting debt, covering not just the retirement money for
      their workers but also the interest on the bonds. New Orleans, Pittsburgh
      and New Jersey have all placed losing bets in recent years.
       
      Almost all pension funds have suffered sizable losses over the last three
      years. Government pension plans can dig themselves into deeper holes because,
      unlike corporate pension plans, they are not bound by federal requirements
      to maintain a certain level of funding. Some have no reserves at all: they
      just pay as they go, out of revenues.
       
      With money tight, municipalities are looking for financial help. This year,
      pension bonds will account for nearly 5 percent of all new municipal bonds,
      up from less than 1 percent in each of the last five years.
       
      In the first nine months of this year, Illinois, Oregon's school boards,
      New Jersey's economic development authority and more than a dozen towns and
      counties sold $13.3 billion in bonds for pension purposes, almost as much
      as the total sold for pensions throughout the 1990's, according to Thomson
      Financial.
       
      More sales are coming. Wisconsin and Oregon each plan one before
      the end of this year, and Kansas has authorized a sale. West Virginia, home
      of the nation's weakest public pension plan  according to a study by
      Wilshire Associates, the state teacher's plan has only $1 for every $5 is
      owes  is fighting a court battle to sell $3.9 billion of the bonds
      without first holding a referendum. In California, a planned $1.9 billion
      bond sale for state employees' pensions contributed to the fiscal uproar
      that led to the recall of Gov. Gray Davis.
       
      Other officials have weighed the risk and declined. "It's really tough to
      justify," said Robert C. North, the chief actuary for New York City's five
      employee pension plans. For years, Mr. North said, investment bankers have
      been urging the city to sell bonds to pay for its pension promises, and every
      time, he argues against it because he believes there are sounder and cheaper
      ways of financing pensions.
       
      "On a risk-adjusted basis, the only people who can make money on this are
      the investment bankers," Mr. North said.
       
      This risk is not always made sufficiently clear, critics say, by financial
      consultants who stand to make money from the bond sales.
       
      New Orleans recently found out just how deep a hole it had dug for itself
      by selling bonds in late 2000 to finance the pensions of 820 retired
      firefighters. In May, city officials asked the manager of the bond sale,
      UBS Financial Services, for a progress report and were shocked to learn that
      the deal was expected to cost the city $270 million over time.
       
      "We were thinking that we were going to make money on it," said Suzy Mague,
      fiscal officer for the New Orleans city council.
       
      City officials say their rosy expectations were created by PaineWebber, the
      lead underwriter, when it described the bond transaction. (PaineWebber, which
      collected a $3 million fee for its role in the bond sale, has since merged
      with UBS.)
       
      "It was basically presented to us as, `Look, this is really the way to go.
      Even if you use the worst estimates, you still break even,' " said Scott
      Shea, a former city council member who served on the budget committee at
      the time.
       
      According to Ms. Mague, PaineWebber said New Orleans would probably have
      to pay about 8.2 percent interest on the bonds. PaineWebber predicted that
      the city could expect to earn 10.7 percent a year, on average, by investing
      the proceeds, mostly in stocks, a prediction based on returns from 1983 to
      1999  a period that encompassed the greatest bull market in history.
       
      A spokeswoman for UBS said that the company did, in fact, include less favorable
      possibilities in its presentation, and did not suggest that 10.7 percent,
      or any other rate of return, was guaranteed.
       
      Mr. Shea said he asked PaineWebber about risk. "I frankly don't recall anybody
      telling me, `Look, if the market tanks, you'll be in worse shape than if
      you had never sold the bonds,' " he said.
       
      New Orleans issued bonds worth $171 million in December 2000, and almost
      immediately, the stock market tanked. Instead of returning 10.7 percent a
      year, the investments have suffered losses of about 3 percent a year.
       
      By June, only $98 million was left  enough to pay the firefighters'
      pensions for just a few more years. When the money runs out, the city will
      still have to pay their pensions  about $17 million a year  but
      then it will also have to pay interest on the bonds of $16 million a year.
       
      Pittsburgh, likewise, sold $294 million of bonds in 1996 and 1998 to buttress
      a skimpy pension plan for its workers. Before that, the city was spending
      about $21 million a year from its operating budget to keep the plan afloat.
       
      After an initial spurt, the pension plan slumped again when stock prices
      fell. Today, Pittsburgh is paying a total of $26 million a year to shore
      up the plan and to pay its bondholders. Two credit-rating agencies recently
      said they were reviewing Pittsburgh and might lower its rating because of
      its indebtedness.
       
      New Jersey had similar results after issuing $2.8 billion of bonds in 1997.
      The sale was the largest of its kind then and made headlines by generating
      $53 million in fees for various securities and law firms.
       
      In the first two years, the deal looked good. New Jersey earned more than
      double the break-even amount. Then the markets turned. As of June, the pension
      plan's five-year average return was 1.9 percent, nowhere near enough to cover
      the pension costs and the bond interest, which this year totaled $890 million.
       
      "This money didn't build a road or a bridge, but we still have to pay it,"
      John E. McCormac, the state treasurer of New Jersey said. The bonds are not
      callable, so the state cannot easily refinance at a lower rate.
       
      Officials may look past unhappy outcomes like these in part because market
      conditions have improved. Stocks are rising. Interest rates are very low,
      and officials see an opportunity to lock in debt at historically attractive
      rates. They can also allay workers' fears that no money has been set aside
      to cover their promised benefits.
       
      Even Orange County in California is considering an issue, despite lingering
      concerns over its bankruptcy proceedings in 1994.
       
      The county got into trouble after taking on undue investment risk, something
      that critics of the new issues fear will happen again as states reach for
      higher returns. New Jersey, for example, has restricted pension investments
      to stocks and bonds, but is now reviewing its portfolio and whether to hire
      an independent money manager, as other states commonly do.
       
      The state's auditor has recommended investing a small amount in alternative
      investments, perhaps real estate, venture capital or other instruments that
      may provide greater returns, at greater risk. No decision has been made.
      Some state employees oppose the change, saying the risks are too great.
       
      Their view is supported by some government finance specialists and academics,
      who argue that speculative investments, even stocks, are unsuitable in pension
      funds. They say that people retire on predictable schedules, and it is safest
      to invest conservatively, in bonds that will mature when people need the
      money.
       
      Depending on market conditions, though, the current crop of bonds could pay
      off handsomely for the governments issuing them.
       
      An Illinois official says that the state's $10 billion bond issue was based
      on an assumption that the money would earn 8 percent to 8.5 percent annually.
      Illinois will pay 5.07 percent interest on the bonds. "As long as the actuaries
      are right," said a spokeswoman for the state budget bureau, "we should be
      safe."
       
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